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largest iteration of the competition to date, with over forty-five countries competing in over forty sports.1  Doha 
was also one of the smallest cities ever to host the games; previous hosts, including Beijing and Bangkok, had 
populations larger than the state of Qatar. However, it was this announcement that began Qatar's transformation 
from  an  oil-rich Arab  monarchy  into  a  21st  century  hub  of  international  commerce  and  diplomacy. 
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Abstract 
 
During the chaos of the Arab Spring, Western diplomacy was facilitated through the State of Qatar. The small 
country's rise into the apex of international relations did not occur immediately after the first sparks of the 
revolution. Rather, Qatar's leadership within the Middle East resulted from years of effort put in by their leaders 
into devising a foreign policy that emphasized building relationships and cooperation with Western countries and 
their Arab counterparts. Qatar's leaders specifically focused their efforts on enhancing their reputation within 
international sporting forums, and the business that resulted from it. Major athletic events like the Asian Games 
boosted the small country's profile around the world, and Qatar became known for their internationalism and 
cosmopolitan outlook. This work would pay off as soon as Arab governments teetered with the demonstrations 
in Egypt and Tunisia. Qatar's high profile status helped maintain the shuttle diplomacy that supported Western 
governments as they tried to contain and control the flames of revolution. 
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The 2011 Arab Spring protests proved to be a watershed moment for Arab foreign policy efforts. In the middle of 
the political chaos, Qatar became the focal point of diplomatic efforts within the Middle East. Western diplomats 
relied on Doha as a key partner in their discussions with Arab leaders and revolutionaries. For many commentators 
and analysts, Qatar's emergence as a regional diplomatic power was unexpected; how could a country with two 
million people punch so far above its weight within the region's geopolitics? The reality is that the seeds of Qatari 
diplomatic prowess were sown not with its recent political successes, but rather with its emergence as a sporting 
power. By winning the bids for and hosting major global sporting events, Qatar had positioned itself as a leading 
power broker for business, diplomacy, and foreign affairs between Western and Eastern states. 
 
Qatar’s rise to prominence through sports 
 
Qatar's rise began on November 12, 2000, when the Olympic Council of Asia officially voted Doha as the host city 
of the 2006 Asian Games. Qatar was the first Arab country to host the games, and also has the honor of holding the 
For Qatar, sports represented perhaps the best means to showcase its aptitude at balancing the complex acts of 
business,  diplomacy,  and  culture. While  major  businesses  saw  Doha  as  a  potential  engine  of  growth  in  the  future,   
it did not have, and still does not have, the economic gravity of major metropolises such as New York, London, or 
Tokyo.2   For Qatari leader Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, hosting a major sporting event would allow the 
government to demonstrate the progress the country had made towards modernization and economic development 
on a  global  stage.3   Using sports as  the primary  mechanism  of  diplomacy  also  made sense  from  a  foreign  policy 
standpoint. By itself, Qatar has little weight, both economically and militarily, in a region where powers such as 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Tran maintain a tenuous peace. Rather, Qatar's foreign policy strengths have come from 
the  relationships  it  maintains  with  the West  and  the Arab  world.  It  trades  and  conducts  business  with  non-Islamic 
countries    such  as  the  United  States,  while  supporting  the  Islamic Wahhabi  faith  that  also  belongs  to  neighboring 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By hosting an international sporting event, Qatar proved that it could successfully merge 
the capitalist interests of the West, the cultural inclinations of the East, and its own domestic priorities- all through 
one  globally  broadcast  event. 
 
Qatar's approach towards sports diplomacy differs from other states' past attempts and is a better representation 
of its foreign policy intentions. States originally used sports diplomacy as a way to showcase raw power and 
industrial strength, something that would not necessarily apply in Qatar's case. Past examples include Adolf 
Hitler's use of the 1936 Olympics to show Nazi Germany's economic prowess after the economic depression 
of the preceding decade. The United States and the Soviet Union both used their hosting of the Olympics to 
make larger geopolitical arguments while demonstrating the success that their individual economic models had 
created. The 2008 Olympics in Beijing advertised China's power in a way that no diplomatic feat could have 
ever accomplished. Some commentators saw the spectacular opening ceremonies as a cue for rising Chinese 
nationalism.4  For a smaller state like Qatar, showing pure power would have been inefficient and possibly 
destabilizing for relations with their neighbors. Tnstead, they would have to use special events as a way to 
demonstrate their aptitude and capacity to work and cooperate with governments and businesses alike. 
 
To that extent, Qatar has extensively relied on its influence within international sports and their related 
organizations as a means of promoting its political and business interests. This policy began with the election 
of Qatari official Mohammad Bin Hammam as the president of the Asian Football Confederation in 2002. 
Tt gave the Qataris a strong voice on the powerful Federation Tnternationale de Football Association (FTFA) 
executive committee, and a commanding podium from which they could promote the interests of Asian countries. 
Additionally, in 2002, Sheikh Tamim Al-Thani, the heir apparent to the Qatari throne and head of the nation's 
Asian Games bid, joined the elite Tnternational Olympic Committee (TOC), giving additional weight to the state's 
sporting ambitions.5 This came after the Doha Development Rounds that Qatar hosted in late 2001, that intended 
to bridge the interests of both established and emerging powers in a series of discussions on issues in international 
trade. 
 
However, the true test of Qatar's unique approach to international relations came as they hosted the Asian Games 
in 2006. Qatar passed its first test and surpassed all expectations; reporters hailed the event as an instant success. 
Not only had a country in the Arab world hosted a major sporting event, but it had done so without many of the 
fears of religious crackdowns and persecutions that its detractors had predicted.6  As Sheikh Tamim Bin Al-Than 
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ion/12brooks.html. 
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said to a reporter, the games reinforced Qatar's status as a, "new centre for top-quality regional and international 
sport and showed how it could be done within the framework of Arab cultural interests."7  Qatar also passed its 
second major test when it hosted the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) Cup, the premier soccer tournament 
for Asian soccer, without any problems. Despite the fact that no teams from the Middle East made it to the 
tournament's final round, there was no doubt in the minds of many people that nations in the Middle East, like 
Qatar's influence in Asian football, had reached a new peak. 8 Many commentators had expected that Qatar's bid 
for the 2022 FTFA World Cup would be contingent on its hosting of these games. FTFA gave its verdict in 2011, and 
Qatar now expects to host the Middle East's first iteration of the tournament in 2022. 
 
Since these recent successes, Qatar's vast influence within the realm of sports and international relations has 
seen a significant rise. Al-Jazeera, a media conglomerate founded by Sheikh Hamad Al-Thani, began growing in 
importance following the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States, as Western viewers sought to learn 
more about cultures within the Middle East. Tt is now responsible for the broadcast of many European sporting 
events and grows as Western media outlets face budgetary constraints. Tndeed, as Leila Abboud and Gwenaelle 
Barzic of Reuters argued, Al-Jazeera's use of sporting licenses have been a key mechanism at building their 
footprint within Europe, allowing them to compete with established giants such as Sky and Canal+.9  Qatari 
sovereign wealth funds have also been on a continental shopping spree, purchasing teams within the English, 
French,  and  Spanish  domestic  leagues. The  massive  investment  outlays  in  each  team,  one  example  being  the 
The policy implications for Qatar's role in the Middle East and their diplomatic powers foreshadow an age 
of Qatari shuttle diplomacy, where the concerns of the Arab World will be articulated and settled from Doha. 
Tn the manner that Qatar became the go-to country for officials seeking to manage issues within the world of 
international sports, international relations within the Middle East has the prospect of being conducted in a similar 
manner. Tt bodes well for all parties seeking to reach an amicable consensus. For Western governments, they see 
a development success, a country that has brought wealth from more than just natural resources, something that 
separates Qatar from its neighbors in the Middle East. As mentioned previously, Qatar's economic prosperity is a 
big reason it is able to have this unique hybrid foreign policy. Despite a slowing of growth in the last few years, 
foreign direct investment in Qatar has grown from U.S. $3.7 billion in 2008 to over U.S. $10 billion in 2010.16 Tt 
has given Doha the financial capacity to host aforementioned global sporting events and the subsequent political 
and economic clout to garner this middle ground between its Islamic heritage and reforms sympathetic to their 
counterparts in the West. Most importantly, though, is Qatar's emphasis on having a global outlook rather than a 
regional one.17 By hosting these major sporting and political events, Qatar can and will act as a diplomatic actor of 
major significance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The State of Qatar's small geographic size does not speak fully of its vast capabilities as a state intent on bridging 
English club Manchester City F.C, have brought in record revenues and, of course, title-ware.10 The shirts of diplomatic divides. Tt has one of the highest per capita GDPs in the world, a modernized civil society that mixes 
the famous Spanish club F.C Barcelona no longer have the United Nations Children's Fund (UNTCEF) as the 
primary sponsor, but rather the Qatar Foundation, a state-sponsored nonprofit aimed at promoting educational 
interests. Tndeed, for the average citizen, Qatar's influence has become a ubiquitous element. Tn France, Qatar- 
based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have donated money to the French banlieues to promote economic 
mobility within depressed areas in the suburbs of Paris.11 
 
Implications for Middle East politics 
 
Of course, the real dividends of Qatar's emphasis on sports diplomacy came with the events of the Arab Spring, 
when Qatar began actively brokering deals between teetering Arab governments and Western powers seeking 
to alleviate the chaos. Having had the experience of organizing deals in the complex world of sports diplomacy, 
creating similar conditions for stabilizing the Middle East would prove to be a challenge the Qataris could easily 
manage. Tndeed, the stage was set nearly at the onset of the Arab Spring, when Qatari moves to manage and 
document  the  multiple  crises  were  appreciated  by  Western  observers.12  Indeed,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Tahrir 
Square protests in late January 2011, it was Al-Jazeera that reported the massive protests happening there. Though 
Al-Jazeera's Cairo office was raided, it showed that the state was fully willing to report on its own to the public. 
Similarly, following the death of former Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi, Qatar's role in supporting the National 
Transitional Council, the Libyan rebel group, was advertised more publically.13Even more shocking for observers 
of the Middle East, Qatar has become the host of nonstate actors that were considered persona non grata by many 
other governments. Following the unrest within Syria, the Qatari's allowed the political operations of Palestinian 
group Hamas, originally based out of Damascus, to relocate to Doha and set up headquarters there.14 At the same 
time, they have allowed the Pashto militant organization, the Taliban, to conduct negotiations with the United   
States  from  Doha.15 
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Western pragmatism with traditional Tslamic law, a savvy leadership capable of accepting change to fit its national 
interests, and a foreign policy agenda that merges these unique paradoxes. Qatar's strength as a diplomatic power 
in the Middle East is showcased by its recent hosting of various sporting events, such as the 2006 Asian Games, 
the 2011 soccer Asian Cup, and the upcoming 2022 FTFA World Cup. Such events are not granted to states lightly 
- Qatar's stance as a mediator between Eastern and Western nations provides testament to its ability to bridge vast 
borders. 
 
Qatar's ability to find diplomatic consensus has major implications for politics within the Middle East. For now, 
it will be able to give hope for peace in a region that has been destabilized by a volatile history, religious fervor, 
terrorism, and now civil unrest. Tnternational actors will certainly look fondly upon Qatar as an actor that can help 
bring together the region to discuss solutions and encourage moderate political reform. 
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